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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 910155-CA 
v. s 
JESUS A. SEPULVEDA, : Priority No, 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1991). This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence 
seized in a warrantless, consensual search of defendant's 
vehicle. The factual findings underlying the trial court's 
ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless they are clearly erroneous; however, in assessing the 
trial court's legal conclusions based on its factual findings, 
the appellate court applies a correction of error standard of 
review. State v. Caver. 814 P.2d 604, 610 (Utah App. 1991). 
Accord United States v. Butler. 904 P.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir. 
1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jesus A. Sepulveda, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with the intent to 
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1991) (R. 2). After the trial 
court denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized, 
a jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 22, 26-41, 70-74, 131). 
The tri^l court sentenced defendant to a term of one to 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and imposed various fines 
and fees (R. 150). The trial court then suspended defendant's 
sentence and imposed a 36 month term of probation (R. 150-51). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
For purposes of the issue raised on appeal, the 
pertinent facts are those set out in the trial court's ruling 
denying defendant's motion to suppress (R. 70-74) (a complete 
copy of the court's decision is contained in addendum D). The 
trial court found as follows: 
From the testimony given it appears that the 
following facts are those testified to by the 
Trooper and not contested by any other 
witness since no one else was called by the 
State or the defendant. 
Trooper Mangelson testified that he first 
observed the defendant vehicle which was a 
Camaro (a stylish General Motor sports car) 
but that it had an expired Utah registration. 
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Upon effecting the stop the officer asked the 
defendant for a driver's license and 
registration which the defendant was unable 
to produce. The defendant claimed the 
vehicle belonged to his friend and was being 
used to return to Utah since the vehicle they 
went to California in broke down. The 
defendant could not give [the] name of his 
friend who ow[n]ed the vehicle nor an 
address. 
The officer noted that as the conversation 
with defendant extended he observed the 
defendant reacting in a very nervous and 
visibly shaking manner. After being asked if 
the vehicle was carrying any drugs or 
firearms and responding [M]no,["] the trooper 
asked if he could search the vehicle to which 
he said ["]go ahead.[u] 
The officer requested the passengers to exit 
the vehicle at which time they did and he 
frisked them for weapons, and found a small 
marijuana pipe in the pocket of a juvenile 
who was a passenger in the vehicle. The 
defendant did not have a key to the trunk[,] 
but got access to it for the search through 
use of a screw driver. While searching the 
vehicle the officer noted screws that had 
paint wear marks on them indicating some form 
of recent use and lead [sic] to the discovery 
of a compartment under the seat wherein one 
kilo of cocaine was retrieved. 
It is also noted that the testimony presented 
by the trooper was to the effect that a 
wom[a]n passenger in the subject vehicle had 
taken the trooper aside and indicated to him 
that she was an agent for the D.E.A. and that 
there was contraband in the car after which 
the officer proceeded to the discovery 
through the compartment under the seat to 
which access was obtained through use of the 
screwdriver on the wore [sic] screws. 
(R. 70-72, see Addendum D). Based on the above findings, the 
trial court concluded as follows: 
The two paramounts [sic] considerations that 
this set of facts give rise to are whether or 
not there was probable cause for the stop of 
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the vehicle, and a subsequent search of it. 
There is also an issue to whether or not the 
defendant under the circumstances of this 
case had any standing to object to the 
officer searching the vehicle aside from the 
probable cause question, and lastly whether 
or not a consent was obtained to search the 
vehicle by the trooper from the defendant. 
The court concludes that the facts in this 
case support the right of the trooper to 
proceed with a search of the vehicle under 
all of the above issues. 
As to the initial stop of the vehicle, the 
only testimony presented indicates that there 
was no valid Utah registration presented for 
the car which showed a violation of the 
registration laws which justified the officer 
in making the stop which would not be 
unreasonable under the circumstances of the 
expired registration observed by the officer. 
The fact that after the stop the defendant 
could not produce a drivers [sic] license nor 
could he give any ownership information other 
than that it was a friend[']s car whose name 
he could not give nor whose address he could 
give would justify the officer in proceeding 
with additional questions which the 
uncontroverted testimony shows that consent 
was given for the vehicle search and no 
evidence would support a showing of the 
consent being coerced or in any manner 
otherwise unlawfully obtained. 
It would appear under the totality of the 
circumstances after the initial stop and 
learning from a third party in the vehicle 
who was identified as a D.E.A. operative was 
a direct statement to the officer that there 
was contraband in the vehicle which occurred 
prior to obtaining the consent[,] or at least 
proceeding with the search would certainly 
give probable cause under exigent 
circumstances, the detention being on a 
highway some distance from a source for 
obtaining a search warrant would certainly 
give probable cause to the officer to 
proceed. The fact that the consent was given 
would clearly confirm the actions of the 
officer in going into areas that he deemed 
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suspicious within the car in locating the 
contraband. 
Based on the foregoing analysis on the basis 
of evidence presented only by the trooper, 
there has been no showing that the search was 
unreasonable, and to the contrary it appears 
that the record shows it to be a reasonable 
search under the circumstances presented by 
this case. 
Defendant's motion to suppress is denied[.] 
(R. 70-72, see Addendum D). 
As noted in the court's ruling, defendant presented no 
evidence at the suppression hearing, nor did he make any legal 
argument before the court (Transcript of suppression hearing, 
October 3, 1990, [ST.] at 3-24) (a copy of the suppression 
hearing transcript is contained in Addendum C). 
Although defendant renewed his motion to suppress at 
trial, he did not articulate any new grounds for suppression or 
otherwise argue the merits of his motion before the court and the 
motion was again denied (T. 43, 73). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The grounds for objection to evidence must be 
distinctly and specifically stated in the trial court before this 
Court will review those grounds on appeal. Because defendant 
failed to challenge the legality of his detention and the 
trooper's reliance on his nervous behavior in the proceedings 
below, he has waived consideration of these issues on appeal. 
The only cognizable issue before this Court concerns 
the voluntariness of defendant's consent to search. However, 
because defendant's argument on appeal is devoid of relevant 
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legal or factual analysis, does not identify any error by the 
court below, and neglects to outline the issue with sufficient 
specificity to allow the State to respond, his argument does not 
merit review. 
Additionally, the trial court found that defendant 
lacked standing to contest the vehicle search. Defendant does 
not challenge this finding on appeal. Thus, even if this Court 
were to look past defendant's waiver of these issues, he lacks 
standing to complain of the vehicle search. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S FAILLE TO ARTICULATE ANY 
ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF HIS 
DETENTION AND THE TROOPER'S RELIANCE ON HIS 
NERVOUS DEMEANOR IN THE TRIAL COURT 
CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF THESE ISSUES ON 
APPEAL 
In Point I of his brief defendant argues that his state 
constitutional rights1 were violated because the trooper lacked 
"reasonable suspicion to detain him or subsequently search his 
vehicle" (Br. of App. at 5). In BDint II of his brief defendant 
argues that his nervous behavior during the stop did not create 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify his detention 
1
 Defendant's reliance on state constitutional 
provisions, both in the trial court and in Point I of his brief 
on appeal, is nominal and lacks any argument as to why this Court 
should engage in a separate state constitutional analysis. See 
R. 40 (Addendum #); Br. of App. at 5. Thus, this Court need not 
analyze defendant's arguments under state constitutional 
provisions. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 n.4 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. 
Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988). 
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or the search of his vehicle (Br. of App. at 7-8). However, 
defendant failed to articulate these particular arguments in the 
trial court and has thus failed to preserve them for review. 
Absent special justification for failing to present all 
available grounds in support of a suppression motion, this Court 
will not rule on those grounds not addressed in the trial court. 
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 n.2 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Carter, 
707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985). The law recited by defendant 
in Points I-II of his brief on appeal was available for 
presentation to the lower court. The record fails to indicate 
any reason for defendant's failure to raise these arguments. 
At the suppression hearing, defendant cross-examined 
Trooper Mangelson, but failed to pinpoint any issue or present 
any argument to the court regarding his detention or nervousness 
(ST. 3-24, see Addendum C). Moreover, defendant did not address 
either of these issues in his written motion to suppress, or in 
his supporting memorandum (R. 22, 26-41) (copies of defendant's 
motion to suppress and supporting memorandum are contained in 
Addendums A and B). Rather, defendant argued that the evidence 
should be suppressed because the warrantless search was conducted 
without probable cause or consent in violation of his 
constitutional rights (R. 22-23, 29-40, see Addendums A and B). 
Although defendant renewed his motion to suppress at trial, he 
again failed to pinpoint any issue or present any argument to the 
court (T. 43, 73). Because defendant failed to raise these 
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particular issues before the trial court, the court made no 
determination thereon, and defendant has waived them for 
consideration on appeal. Price, 827 P.2d at 248; Archambeau, 820 
P.2d at 922; Carter, 707 P.2d at 660-61. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE CITATION AND 
ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT AUTHORITY AND FACTS 
PRECLUDES APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE 
VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS CONSENT TO SEARCH 
In Point III of his brief defendant asserts that his 
consent to search was both involuntary and resulted from the 
trooper's exploitation of the alleged illegal detention (Br. of 
App. 9-10). However, as demonstrated in Point I of this brief, 
defendant failed to articulate any argument concerning the 
legality of his detention in the trial court. Rather, defendant 
argued that he did not consent to the vehicle search or, 
alternatively, that his consent was involuntary (R. 22, 26-41, 
see Addendums A and B). Thus, defendant's assertion on appeal 
that his consent was obtained through the trooper's exploitation 
of the alleged prior illegal detention has not been preserved for 
review. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 (Utah App. 1992); 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991); State v. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985). 
The only cognizable issue before this Court concerns 
the voluntariness of defendant's consent to search. However, 
defendant's argument on appeal consists merely of a legal 
citation concerning the state's burden for proving voluntary 
consent and a rhetorical statement questioning the intelligent 
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nature of his consent (Br. of App. 9-10). His argument is 
otherwise devoid of relevant legal or factual analysis, and is 
thus meaningless. The Rules of Appellate Procedure require that 
a brief on appeal include an argument which "shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes, 
and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
Because defendant's argument fails to comply with the briefing 
rule, lacks any meaningful analysis, does not identify any error 
by the court below, and neglects to outline the issue with 
sufficient specificity to allow the State to respond, his 
argument does not merit review. Price, 827 P.2d at 248-50; State 
v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Amicone, 
689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
Additionally, the trial court found that defendant 
lacked standing to contest the vehicle search (R. 72, see 
Addendum D). Defendant does not challenge this finding on appeal 
(Br. of App. at 5-10). Thus, even if this Court were to look 
past defendant's waiver, he lacks standing to complain of the 
vehicle search. State v. Atwood, 186 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 34 n.l 
(Utah App. May 12, 1992) (proponent of a motion to suppress has 
the burden of establishing that his own constitutional rights 
were violated by the challenged search and seizure). 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this &M day of June, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
^M_ 
CER 
jistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Milton T. Harmon, attorney for appellant, P.O. Box 97, Nephi, 
Utah 84648, this cff day of June, 1992v 
pitM fJDfi 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
C M * ©1 DttWe* Court, Jusb Cou 
F I L E D 
APR 41950 
MILTON T. HARMON #1373 
Attorney for the Defendant 
36 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 97 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (801) 623-1802 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, :
 r 
Case No. A ?(f -Z) 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
JESUS A. SEPULVEDA, : 
Defendant. : Judge 
Comes now the Defendant and moves the above-entitled court to 
suppress evidence seized in the search of the vehicle in which the 
Defendant was riding at the time of his arrest. 
This motion is made for the reason that the State alleges that 
a search of the subject vehicle was made with the consent of the 
Defendant. That, in reviewing the matter with the Defendant, he 
has advised counsel that he did not give such consent, nor did the 
officer have probable cause to search the vehicle. 
Therefore, the Defendant requests that hearing be had upon 
this motion to determine if appropriate consent was given and, if 
there was no consent given, that all evidence seized in the search 
of the vehicle be suppressed and not be admitted as evidence in any 
proceeding hereafter. 
DATED this <&/ day of March, 1990. 
SO&ML f - M ^ 
'MILTON T.'4iARM0N 
Attorney f o r the Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion to Suppress Evidence to: Mr. Donald J. Eyrer Jr./ 
Juab County Attorney, 125 North Main Street, Nephi, UT 84648 and 
Mr. Jesus A. Sepulveda, 1146 South 500 East, Apt. #4, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84102; first-class postage prepaid, this ^ / day of 
March, 1990. 
ADDENDUM B 
MILTON T. HARMON #1373 
Attorney for the Defendant 
36 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 97 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (801) 623-1802 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : Criminal No. 296-D 
Plaintiff, : 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
vs. : SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
JESUS A. SEPULVEDA, : 
Defendant. Judge George E. Ball if 
Comes now the defendant and submits the following Memorandum 
in support of his Motion To Suppress: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
1. The defendant, while traveling on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah, 
on January 30, 1990, was stopped by officer Paul Mangelson, of the 
Utah Highway Patrol. The vehicle driven by the defendant was in 
all respects, being operated in an appropriate and legal manner. 
But the vehicle registration was good only through the month of 
Of
 B 
December, 1990. The expired registration was the ostensible reason 
for the stop. Although, officer Mangelson did testify that based 
upon his extensive experience in drug interdiction, the defendant, 
and the car in which he was traveling did meet a "loose" drug 
courier profile, i.e. sporty general motors car, (Camero) traveling 
in a northerly direction on 1-15, and driven by persons of Spanish-
Mexican origin, and that this profile caused his initial suspicion. 
2. The defendant, as the officer observed when he began to 
converse with him, spoke Spanish. The defendant speaks Spanish as 
his primary language, and can speak and understand a "little" 
English. 
3. After an initial inquiry about drivers license, registra-
tion, and destination, defendant was directed to exit the vehicle. 
The officer indicates that there was a discussion about the vehicle 
owner. The defendant had borrowed the vehicle for a trip from 
California to Utah. 
4. As the officer conversed with the defendant, he noted he 
was visibly shaking. The officer obviously attributed this conduct 
to the defendant's wrongdoing, ignoring an obvious response of the 
2 
ai 
defendant to the cold weather. The officer had the car occupants 
exit the vehicle and began a search. 
5. At this point the officer became suspicious and determined 
to conduct an investigatory search and inquiry. He suspected, 
because of the loose profilef as recited above, the defendant's 
shaking, and disturbed paint on the screw head which secured the 
seat back, and his prior experience with similar vehicles contain-
ing drugs in the vent area, that the defendant was transporting 
illegal drugs. 
6. The officer then said he asked for permission to search 
(to look into) the vehicle. His recollection is that permission 
was given by words as "go ahead". The officer testified, he then 
asked the defendant to step from the vehicle. The vehicle was in 
part dismantled by the seat back cover being removed. Cocaine was 
discovered in the area. 
7. The officer testified that the defendant did not entirely 
understand the officer during the course of these events, and had 
to rely in part upon a passenger, who as it turns out was a state 
law enforcement agent, interpreting for him. The defendant denies 
3 
as? 
that he was asked for, or gave permission to search or look into 
the vehicle. 
ISSUES: 
The primary issue of the legality of the search and seizure, 
all done without a warrant. In the absence of a warrant the State 
must rely upon A. Probable cause, or B. Consent. The defendants 
contend that neither circumstance is present, thus the search and 
seizure were not proper and the result should be suppression of the 
cocaine as evidenced in the criminal prosecution. These issues 
will be addressed in the above Order. 
A. Was there probable cause to allow a search 
and seizure without a warrant? 
1. It is well settled under Utah law that the determination 
of probable c^se requires a close examination of facts in each 
individual case State v. Earl 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986). 
2. The facts in this case upon which the State can rely to 
constitute probable cause are as follows: 
a. The subject car was a sporty general 
motors car. 
4 
a<i 
c. The car was traveling in a northerly 
direction on Interstate Highway 15. 
d. The defendant clad in a T-shirt, was 
shaking when exposed to the cold January 
temperatures. 
e. The seat back cover on the driver's side 
was fastened with a screw, and the paint on 
this screw head had been disturbed. 
f. The investigating officer had prior ex-
perience with general motors cars being driven 
on 1-15 where drugs were located in the area 
of the seat back. 
g. The occupants of the vehicle were of 
Spanish-Mexican origin. 
3. It must certainly be admitted that any one of the above 
factors, standing alone, would not constitute probable cause. This 
is for the reason that each listed item is a perfectly legal act. 
The next question is, do these facts, by reason of their combina-
tion, constitute probable cause. The defendant asserts that they 
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do not. There is nothing unique about these set of facts that 
would indicate probable cause. The conclusion is based upon an 
analysis of cases where the Utah Courts have found probable cause. 
Briefly, in all such cases there had been some sign of an indepen-
dent illegal act, such as an odor of marijuana, or visible drug 
paraphernalia. See the following instructive cases where probable 
cause has been found: 
State v. Earl, supra, these facts were found to exist. 1. 
Strong odor of marijuana coming from the interior of the vehicle. 
2. Defendants were driving a rental car after flying to Arizona 
from Utah, suggesting he was a drug courier. 3. Strong air 
fresheners. 4. A loaded firearm, readily accessible to the 
defendants. 5. A quantity of controlled substances and parapher-
nalia were found in the vehicle when it was stopped. £• The 
defendants told the officer that additional marijuana was probably 
located in the car. All of these objective facts were known to the 
officer prior to the search being conducted. And the court found 
that they constituted probable cause. 
6 
SI 
State v, Dorsey 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986), where the court 
found objective facts to justify the ultimate conclusion that there 
was probable cause: 1. The officers were attempting to make a 
controlled buy of a large quantity of cocaine, 2. The suppliers 
had cocaine in the LaQuinta Motel in rooms 131 and 137. 3. That 
someone involved in the transaction was wearing a dark leather 
jacket. 4. That someone wearing a dark leather jacket was seen 
in the motel parking lot carrying a bag and behaving suspiciously. 
5. That after the deal was called off, the persons in room 131 and 
137 left the motel. One wearing a dark leather jacket. 6. That 
these two persons walked from the motel directly to a silver truck 
with license plates containing the numbers 3535. The officer 
stopped this truck and conducted a search where cocaine was found. 
Other cases could be cited but the above cases are excellent 
for the general example given. And based upon this example 
defendants contend that the factors available to the officer in 
the case now before the court do not rise to the basis for probable 
cause. 
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B. Was there a valid consent to search and 
seize? 
1. There is a conflict in the testimony regarding consent. 
The officer said consent was received. The defendant denies that 
he gave consent. This may be explained by the language used by the 
defendant. The officer spoke in English and did not understand 
Spanish. The defendant, spoke fluently in Spanish, and a little 
in English. 
2. With these circumstances in mind, let us look at some 
legal interpretation and guidelines regarding consent to search a 
vehicle: 
3. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), the 
United States Supreme Court examined the "consent exception" to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In that case, the 
court noted that one of the well-established exceptions to the 
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment is 
a search conducted pursuant to voluntary consent. The question 
dealt with was what must the prosecution prove to demonstrate that 
a consent was "voluntarily" given. 
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4. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the 
"voluntariness" required for a consent to search should be the same 
as the voluntariness showing required in a police interrogation, 
i.e. miranda warning and waiver of rights. The court however 
stated that any coercion, explicit or implicit, would negate a 
voluntary consent. In making such proof the government need not 
show that the person had been specifically warned of his right to 
refuse to a consent to a search. The court also rejected the 
defendant's claim that the consent to search was like a waiver of 
a constitutional right at a criminal trial. It was stated that the 
test to be applied is the traditional test of voluntariness. That 
is the prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the consent 
was freely and voluntarily given and was not the result of duress 
or coercion. Voluntariness, it was held, is a question of fact to 
be determined from all the circumstances. 
5. The court then discussed some of the factors to be 
considered when applying this totality of the circumstances test. 
These include; the defendant's intelligence, whether or not the 
defendant was in custody, the nature of the police questioning and 
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the environment in which it took place, the defendant's knowledge 
of his right to withhold consent, and any other circumstances that 
weigh on the issue of voluntariness. 
6. This issue of coercion as it relates to a consent to 
search has also been addressed by the Supreme Court in other con-
texts. 
7. In Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983), it was held 
that a stop of an individual on less than probable cause cannot 
justify a detention in a small room by two police officers. The 
officers had retained the defendant's airline ticket and iden-
tification. They then had his luggage brought to the room where 
he was held. The court found that such a situation would result 
in the defendant's belief that he was under arrest. Because the 
defendant had not been informed that he was free to board his plane 
and he actually believed he was being detained, it was held that 
the encounter had lost its consensual nature. The court went on 
to hold that, as a practical matter, Royer was under arrest. Since 
there was no probable cause to arrest him, the search was illegal, 
10 
% 
and the evidence was ordered suppressed. The court then made some 
observations about the nature of searches based on consent: 
" . . . where the validity of a search rests on 
consent, the State has the burden of proving 
that the necessary consent was obtained and 
that it was freely and voluntarily given, a 
burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere 
submission to a claim of lawful authority." 
8. The Court Of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a 
similar issue in United States v. Racaldey 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 
1985). In that case, the defendant had been stopped for speeding 
in New Mexico. He produced a Virginia driver's license. The car 
was not registered to the defendant. The officer ran an NCIC check 
to determine if the vehicle had been reported as stolen. That 
check was negative. He then requested assistance from a backup 
officer stating that he had a "gut instinct" that the defendant was 
transporting narcotics. The officer returned to the defendant's 
car and told Recalde he could either plead not guilty or sign the 
ticket. When it was signed, the officer asked the defendant to 
step out of the car and then requested to inspect the trunk. 
During the inspection, the officer found that some of the screws 
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in the molding had been tampered with. The officer then requested 
that the defendant accompany him to a nearby town which the 
defendant agreed to do. At no time had the officer returned the 
defendant's driver's license, the vehicle registration, or the 
traffic ticket. At the police station the defendant consented to 
the search of the car. 
9. In analyzing the issue of whether the search was made with 
the defendant's consent, the Tenth Circuit employed a three tier 
analysis. It was described as follows: 
"First, there must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was unequivocal and 
specific. Second, the government must es-
tablish that the consent was given without 
duress or coercion. Finally, we evaluate 
those first two standards with a traditional 
indulgence of the courts against a presumption 
of waiver of constitutional rights." at 1453. 
10. In determining the issue of duress or coercion in 
obtaining consent to search, the Supreme Court Of Utah has 
described a number of factors that should be considered. In State 
v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the court stated: 
"Clearly the prosecution has the burden of 
establishing from the totality of the cir-
cumstances that the consent was voluntary 
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given; howeverf the prosecution is not re-
quired to prove that defendant knew of his 
right to refuse. Factors which inay show a 
lack of duress or coercion include: 1) The 
absence of a claim of authority to search by 
the officers: 2) The absence of an exhibition 
of force by the officers; 3) A mere request 
to search; 4) Cooperation by the owner of the 
vehicle; and 5) The absence of deception or 
trick on the part of the officer." [Footnote 
omitted] at 106. 
11. Several other Utah cases have held that the question 
regarding a Fourth Amendment violation turns on the issue of 
reasonableness. State v. White, 577 P.2d 552 (Utah 1978); State 
v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1975); State v. Kaae, 30 Ut. 2d 73, 
513 P.2d 435 (Utah 1973). Under the test, courts are to balance 
the interests of society against that of the individual. The court 
would typically describe this test as follows: 
"In regard to the propriety of the search; it 
is to be had in mind that the constitutional 
protections are only against unreasonable 
searches. The test to be applied is whether 
under all of the circumstances, fair-minded 
persons, giving due consideration to the 
rights and interest of the public, as well as 
to those of the suspect, would judge the 
search to be an unreasonable intrusion into 
the latter's rights. A further important 
observation is that the just-stated test to 
gauge the validity of a search without a 
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warrant is satisfied if consent is given to 
the search, as was done here; and that these 
rules apply even when the suspect is in cus-
tody." [Footnotes omitted] State v. White, 
supra, at 553-554* 
However, in State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981), three of 
the justices expressly rejected the White holding, as it failed to 
comport with the requirements of the United States Supreme Court's 
rulings on the Fourth Amendment. The majority of the court adopted 
the standard that searches not made pursuant to a valid warrant 
were per se unreasonable, and subject to the sell delineated 
exceptions. 
12. In the present case there is conflicting evidence on the 
issue of whether or not the defendant voluntarily consented to the 
search. This evidence must be weighed in light of the presumption 
^gainst waiver of a constitutional right. Furthermore, as 
previously described, the state bears the burden of proving that 
there was in fact a voluntary consent to the search of the car. 
13. The final point to be considered regarding consent 
relates to the extent of the consent, or the area to which consent 
would relate, if there were in fact consent. In respect to this 
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matter, the defendants represent that if the court should find that 
there was a consent, that consent was just to look into the 
vehicle, and would not extend to an examination of the vehicle by 
removing mechanically fastened vent covers, the turning of screws, 
etc. See State v. Marshall, Utah Court Of Appeals, case number 
890121-CA, filed December 26, 1989. A copy of this Opinion is 
attached hereto 
CONCLUSION: 
Based upon the facts of this case, a reasonable interpretation 
of the law, the cocaine seized from the seat back compartment 
should be suppressed for the reason that the search and seizure 
were conducted without a warrant, in violation of the defendants 
Federal, State and Constitutional rights, and that the State has 
not met its burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
exception to the warrant requirement existed. 
Respectfully submitted this ^rr^t day of October, 1990. 
MILTQ« T. HARMON 
Attorney For The Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Defendants Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Suppress 
to: Mr. Jesus A. Sepulveda, c/o Eunice Diaz, 217 South Foss Street, 
Apt. #28, Salt Lake City, UT 84104 and to Mr. Donald J. Eyre, Jr., 
Juab County Attorney, 125 North Main Street, Nephi, UT 84648; 
first-class postage prepaid, this <f7t*< day of October, 1990. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Gregory Marshall, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Petition for Interlocutory Appea 
Seventh District, Sevier County 
The Honorable Don V, Tibbs 
Attorneys: Jerold D. McPhee and Kristine K. Smith, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt 
Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Jackson. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall ("Mr. Marshall"), was 
charged with possession of a controlled substance with the intent 
to distribute for value, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pre-trial 
motion to suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana seized from the 
rental car he was driving when he was arrested. The trial court 
denied Mr. Marshall's motion and he filed this interlocutory 
appeal. We reverse. 
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure of the contraband 
in detail as the legal issues presented are fact sensitive. 
State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery ("Trooper Avery") was driving 
on Interstate 70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a motor home. Trooper 
Avery observed that Mr. Marshall's turn signal remained blinking 
for approximately two miles after he passed the motor home. Mot 
knowing whether Mr. Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or 
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the signal on, Trooper 
4x 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890121-CA 
FILED 
W T r y T -Noonto 
** Court 
U»h C#ort * Apptftis 
Avery pulled the vehicle over to inform Mr. Marshall of the 
problem and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper Avery had 
issued similar warning citations for turn signal violations 
approximately five to ten times in the previous six-month period. 
Prior to stopping Mr* Marshall, Trooper Avery noticed the 
vehicle had California license plates. He approached Mr. 
Marshall's vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn signal 
problem. Mr. Marshall responded that he had been having "a hard 
time keeping the thing turned off." 
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his driver's license and 
vehicle registration. Mr. Marshall produced a New York driver's 
license and a California rental agreement for the vehicle. Mr. 
Marshall said he was going skiing in Denver and planned to return 
the car to San Diego, California. However, the rental agreement 
indicated that the car would be returned in New York in five days. 
Trooper hv&fy acknowledged he became suspicious that Mr. 
Marshall might be transporting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr. 
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car where he issued a 
warning citation for "Lights, head, tail, other." Trooper Avery 
then returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the rental 
agreement. 
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying 
alcohol, drugs or firearms. Mr. Marshall stated he was not. 
Trooper Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could "look inside 
the vehicle." Mr. Marshall responded, "Go ahead." Trooper Avery 
and Mr. Marshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's vehicle. The 
passenger door was locked and Mr. Marshall reached in on the 
driver's side to open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a small 
red bag on the floor of the vehicle and asked if he could open 
it. Mr. Marshall agreed. No contraband was found inside the bag 
or the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall had a key to the 
trunk and if Mr. Marshall would open the trunk. Mr. Marshall 
attempted to open the trunk, but was shaking so badly that 
Trooper Avery had to assist him by holding the key latch cover up 
while Mr. Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw four 
padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall opened the trunk. Trooper 
Avery asked Mr. Marshall what the suitcases contained and Mr. 
Marshall responded "clothes." Trooper Avery then asked if he 
could look in the suitcases. Mr. Marshall immediately reversed 
his statement and responded that the suitcases were not his and 
must have already been in the trunk when he rented the vehicle. 
Trooper Avery testified there was some play in the zipper of one 
bag and he unzipped it far enough to see a green leafy 
substance. Trooper Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for 
possession of a controlled substance. 
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Mr. Marshall did not testify or present any evidence to 
contradict Trooper Averyfs testimony during the hearing below. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
-[W]e will not disturb the trial courtfs factual evaluation 
underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
unless it is clearly erroneous.* State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 
974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). £££ also State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987); State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Further, *[t]he trial court's finding is clearly 
erroneous only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence 
or if [the appellate court] reach[es] a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made," State v. Serv. 758 
P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
STANDING—EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
The state argues that we need not reach the issues asserted 
by Mr. Marshall that Trooper Avery's stop of Mr. Marshall was an 
unconstitutional pretext, or that his consequent detention 
exceeded constitutional limits, or that Mr. Marshall did not 
voluntarily consent to the search of the suitcases found in the 
trunk of his rental car. As a threshold argument, the state 
claims that Mr. Marshall lacks standing to challenge the seizure 
of the suitcases as he disclaimed any ownership or possessory 
interest in the suitcases both during the search and subsequent 
to his arrest and, thus, had no expectation of privacy in their 
contents.1 See Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128, 138-50 (1978); 
State v. Valdez. 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Grueber. 776 P.2d 70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. DeAlo, 
748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The fatal problem with the state's argument is the state 
raises standing for the first time on appeal. The Utah Supreme 
1. The state relies upon the following testimony from the 
preliminary hearing: 
Q. And what was inside the trunk? 
A. There were four suitcases. 
Q. Did you ask if you could look in those suitcases? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I asked him what 
was in the suitcases, and he told me, right quickly, 
clothes. Then when I looked at him again, he told me 
that he didn't know where they came from, they must have 
been in there when he rented the car. 
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Court recently squarely held that standing to challenge the 
validity of a search under the fourth amendment •'is not a 
jurisdictional doctrine [but] is a substantive doctrine that 
identifies those who may assert rights against unlawful searches 
and seizures.- State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah 
1989). Citing the general rule that a substantive issue or 
"claim of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal," 
the court deemed the issue of standing waived. Id. at 1138-39• 
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser, claiming that in 
Schlosser the state not only failed to laise the issue of 
standing in the motion to suppress hearing, but also on appeal. 
We do not find the distinction determinative. We believe the 
Schlosser standing rule was fashioned to protect the defendant 
from being required to deal with new legal issues on appeal when 
he had no warning of the necessity to develop the relevant facts 
below. 
In this case, the state, the defendant, and the trial court 
all focused on the issue of voluntary consent to search the 
suitcases, not standing to assert a privacy interest in the 
suitcases. The defendant may well have chosen to testify at the 
motion to suppress hearing to contradict the trooperfs testimony 
that he had disclaimed owwrrship of the suitcases had the state 
chosen to litigate the issue of standing below. 
In Steaoald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), the United 
States Supreme Court also refused to allow the government to 
raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time 
on appeal. The Court refused to allow the state to claim that 
the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the house searched 
as a ground for sustaining the lower court's ruling denying a 
motion to suppress when the state had not made this claim at 
trial. The Court concluded: 
The Government, however, may lose its 
right to raise factual issues of this sort 
before this Court when it has made 
contrary assertions in the courts below, 
when it has acquiesced in contrary 
findings by those courts, or when it has 
failed to raise such questions in a timely 
fashion during the litigation. 
i£. at 209. 
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Thus, we conclude that the state may not for the first time 
on appeal claim that Mr. Marshall lacks standing to assert a 
privacy interest in the contraband seized to uphold the trial 
court's denial of the motion to suppress.2 
2. Our conclusion may seem at odds with the general rule that we 
"may affirm the trial court's decision on any proper grounds, 
even though the trial court assigned another reason fox- its 
ruling.- State v. Brvan. 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985). We 
agree with the general rule, but find the issue of fourth 
amendment standing to be unique. Fourth amendment standing 
involves more than simply applying another legal principle to 
sustain an evidentiary ruling. The failure to raise a fourth 
amendment standing claim is more analogous to the failure to 
plead and try an affirmative defense or an attempt to assert a 
new theory of recovery for the first time on appeal. See 
Banoerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) (-It is 
axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the parties in 
the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.-); 
State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(defendant cannot raise constitutional issues for first time on 
appeal); Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998, 1005 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (defendant cannot raise affirmative defense for first time 
on appeal); James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (-matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at 
the trial may not be raised for the first time on appeal.-); 
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs.. Inc.. 739 P.2d 634, 637 n.2 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (matters not presented to trial court prior 
to summary judgment cannot be raised for first time on appeal). 
The state asserts fourth amendment standing to validate what 
otherwise would be an unconstitutional search. The defendant 
must have an opportunity to factually meet this defense to an 
unconstitutional search. 
Furthermore, although the Utah Supreme Court applied the 
waiver of fourth amendment standing rule to uphold the trial 
court's granting of a motion to suppress in Schlosser. the court 
relied on State v. Goodman. 42 Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 
(1985), which held the state could not raise the issue of 
standing for the first time on appeal to provide an alternative 
ground for sustaining the trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress. Ifi. at 1060. 
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PRETEXT STOP 
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper Avery used the fact 
that his turn signal was malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his 
vehicle to search for evidence of drug trafficking. 
The protective shield of the fourth amendment applies when an 
officer stops an automobile on the highway and detains its 
occupants. State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). A police officer may constitutionally stop a citizen on 
two alternative grounds. First, the stop "could be based on 
specific, articulable facts which, together with rational 
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person 
to conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a 
crime.- Id. (citing Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State 
v. Christiansen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Truiillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Second, the police 
officer can "stop an automobile for a traffic violation committed 
in the officer's presence." Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977. However, 
an officer may not use a traffic violation stop as a pretext to 
search for evidence of a more serious crime. I&. 
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr. Marshall's vehicle 
to investigate his hunch that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved 
in drug trafficking, we determine whether a hypothetical 
reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances 
confronting him or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to issue 
a warning for failing to terminate a turn signal. I&. at 978. 
Mr. Marshall claims Trooper Averyfs stop of his vehicle is 
similar to the stop we found unconstitutional in Sierra. We 
disagree. In Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was that 
the driver remained in the left lane too long after passing a 
car. In this case, Trooper Avery perceived an equipment problem 
with Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was 
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to turn it off.3 
Courts consistently have held that a police officer can stop a 
3. While the warning citation does not specify which provision 
of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated, the state asserts that 
his conduct was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-117(1) 
(1988) which, with our emphasis, provides: 
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car when he or she believes the car's safety equipment is not 
functioning properly.4 
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra, Trooper Avery was 
not suspicious of Mr* Marshall for other reasons before the stop, 
had not followed him in order to find seme reason to pull him 
over, and, before the alleged violation occurred, had not radioed 
for help thereby indicating he intended to stop the vehicle. 
In conclusion, we find Trooper Avery's stop of Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle was not a pretext, but was a valid exercise of police 
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's vehicle was functioning 
properly. 
(Footnote 3 continued) 
It is a misdemeanor for any person to 
drive or move or for the owner to cause or 
knowingly permit to be driven or moved on 
any highway any vehicle or combination of 
vehicles which is in such unr.afe condition 
as to endanger any person, 01 which does 
not contain those parts or is not 9t all 
times equipped with lamps and other 
equipment in proper condition and 
adjustment • • • • 
4. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1979), the 
United States Supreme Court st ted that an officer has a duty in 
the interest of highway safety to stop vehicles for safety 
reasons. "Many violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements 
are observable, and something can be done about them by the 
observing officer, directly and immediately." Id. at 660. The 
Court inferred that as long as an officer suspects the driver is 
violating "any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and 
equipment regulations," the police officer may legally stop the 
vehicle. Id* at 661. fififi Townsel v. State, 763 P*2d 1353, 1355 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court held stop justified when vehicle's 
headlight was out, a tail light was broken, the license plate and 
windows were obscured, and speeding); State v. Puia. 112 Ariz. 
519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975) (suspicion of defective turn 
signals justified stop); State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me. 
1989) (stop justified when blinking headlights led officer to 
stop vehicle for safety reasons). 
890121-CA 7 
^ 
UNREASONABLE DETENTION 
Next, Mr. Marshall complains generally that the extent of his 
detention and the scope of Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded 
constitutional limits*5 Again, we disagree. 
Once a driver is lawfully stopped, an officer may inquire as 
to information about the driver and the vehicle "reasonably 
related in scope to the justification- for the detention. United 
States v. Briononi-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (quoting Terrv 
v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)). 
The United States Supreme Court has not chosen to define a 
bright-line rule as to the acceptable length of a detention 
because -common sense and ordinary human experience must govern 
over rigid criteria.- United States v.. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675, 685 
(1985). The Court has chosen to focus, not on the length of the 
detention alone, but on -whether the police diligently pursued a 
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain 
the defendant.- Id. at 686. 
In Sharpe. the Court found that a twenty-minute detention 
after a highway stop for suspected drug trafficking was not 
excessive where the officer examined the driverfs license, 
examined his ownership papers, requested and was denied 
permission to search the camper, and then stepped on the rear 
bumper, noting that it did not move, thus confirming his 
suspicion that it was overloaded. Id. at 687. The Court 
distinguished this reasonable detention from those involved in 
Dunawav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Florida v. Rover. 460 
U.S. 491 (1983); and United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696 (1983), 
stating that it was not the length of detention, but the events 
which occurred during the detention which transformed the 
5. We do not analyze this issue under article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution as the state constitutional issue was not 
sufficiently particularized below nor is a reasoned analysis 
provided on appeal as to why our analysis should be different 
under Utahfs constitution. BS& State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 
327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
890121-CA 8 
49 
investigative stops in these cases into a "defacto arrest*- ifi. 
at 683-86.6 
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning citation within ten 
minutes of stopping Mr. Marshall. Based upon the facts obtained 
during routine questioning and issuing the warning citation, the 
officer became suspicious that Mr. Marshall was involved in 
transporting drugs. He returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license, 
the car rental agreement and the citation. Trooper Avery then 
asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying weapons, alcohol, or drugs 
in the vehicle. Mr. Marshall responded he was not. Then Trooper 
Avery immediately asked for permission to look into the vehicle 
and received Mr. Marshall's consent. 
We find that Trooper Avery's initial investigation was within 
the scope of his traffic stop and that Trooper Avery's immediate 
request to search the vehicle and his expeditious completion of 
the search did not constitute an unreasonable detention. 
Furthermore, Mr. Marshall was not moved to another location nor 
treated in a manner to support a finding of a "defacto arrest." 
CONSENT 
Finally, Mr. Marshall argues that even if his initial stop 
and subsequent detention were not constitutionally deficient, the 
subsequent search of the suitcases found in the trunk of the 
vehicle without a warrant violated his fourth amendment rights. 
The state contends, on the other hand, that Mr. Marshall 
consented to the search of the suitcases and thus Trooper Avery9s 
6. Dunawav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (defendant taken 
from neighbor's home, tiansported unwillingly to police station, 
was subjected to custodial interrogation for one hour until he 
made incriminating statements); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 
(1983) (defendant stopped at airport, his luggage seized, then he 
was taken to a small room where he was questioned and his luggage 
inspected); United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696 (1983) 
(defendant stopped at airport, his luggage seized for 90 minutes 
to take it to narcotics detection dog for "sniff test," police 
knew of arrival time and should have had the dog on hand). 
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search of the suitcases and subsequent seizure of the mariiuana 
without a search warrant was constitutionally permissible.' 
A search is valid under the fourth amendment if it is 
conducted as a result of the defendants voluntary consent. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); St9te vf 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) • "[T]he question 
[of] whether a consent to a search was in fact •voluntary1 or was 
the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a 
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the 
circumstances." Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 227. ••A trial court's 
finding of voluntary consent will not be reversed unless it is 
clearly erroneous," United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130 
(1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979). 
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977), 
the Tenth Circuit outlined the specifics necessary for the 
government to sustain its burden to sh°™ *h»t voluntary consent 
was given: 
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was 
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and 
intelligently given"; (2) the government 
must prove consent was given without 
duress or coercion, express or implied; 
and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver 
of fundamental constitutional rights and 
there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived. 
7. The .state does not argue that Trooper Avery had probable 
cause to search either the car or the suitcases. We, therefore, 
need not deal with the troublesome issue of whether probable 
cause to search an automobile is sufficient under the automobile 
exception to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk of a 
car. £££, e.g.. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (if 
probable cause exists, police can search closed containers found 
in vehicle); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) 
(warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi 
invalid); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) 
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the trunk of a 
vehicle invalid); State v. Hvoh. 711 P.2d 264, 272 n.l (Utah 
1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately) (criticizing the 
ROSS holding). 
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Icl. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 
(10th Cir. 1962)). £££ glgp United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 
1448, 1453 (10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whittenback. 
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 
980-81 (Utah Ct. Appl 1988). 
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to a search, the 
ensuing search roust be liroited in scope to only the specific area 
agreed to by defendant. "The scope of a consent search is 
limited by the breadth of the actual consent itself. . . . Any 
police activity that transcends the actual scope of the consent 
given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect." 
United States v. Gav. 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985); ££g, 
6tqt# People v. Thiret. 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope of 
consent exceeded when police asked to "look around" the house, 
then conducted a 45-minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and 
closed containers). 
The trial court made the following finding on the issue of 
Mr. Marshall's consent: "The Defendant consented to the search. 
There was no evidence of duress or coercion." This conclusory 
finding on consent is not particularly helpful in determining 
whether Mr. Marshall's consent was "unequivocal and specific" as 
it does not detail what Mr. Marshall agreed could be 
searched—the interior of the passenger compartment, the trunk, 
or the locked suitcases. The relevant portions irom the 
transcript of Trooper Avery's testimony are more enlightening: 
Q. What were the words he [sic] used when you asked him to 
search his vehicle? 
A. I asked Mr. Marshall if—if there were any—if there was 
any—were there any drugs in the vehicle, and he took 
two or three seconds—no, wait a minute, I guess—I 
first asked him if he was carrying any weapons and he 
told me no. I then asked him if he was carrying any—if 
there was any alcohol in the vehicle, he said that he 
did not drink. I recall both answers were quite quick. 
And then I asked him if there were any drugs in the 
vehicle, he paused for, you know, probably two or three 
seconds, and then told me no. I then asked him if it 
would be okay if I looked in the vehicle, search the 
vehicle, and he said go ahead. 
Q. Now, di4 you ask if you could look in the vehicle, or 
did you ask if you could search the vehicle. 
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A. Well, according to this [his report], I said—I asked if 
I could look in the vehicle. 
Q. So, it was "look in the vehicle"? 
You didn't ask if you could open anything inside the 
vehicle or anything else, did you? 
A. No. I just asked if I could look in the vehicle. 
Q. And what happened then? 
A. Mr. Marshall just told roe, you know, he said go right 
ahead. He got out, gathered up his papers and we walked 
up to the front of the vehicle, and he had to open the 
passenger door, as I recall. 
Q. And how did you get in the trunk? 
A. I asked him, I said—asked him if he had the key to the 
trunk and he says yes, and I says—and I asked him if 
he's [sic] open it, which he did, he tried. He was 
extremely nervous at the time. I— 
Q. So did you open the trunk? 
A. No, sir, I did not. He—he could not—there was a 
little latch over the key hole. He was shaking so hard, 
he couldn't even hold the latch open, so I held the 
latch up for him so he could insert the key. 
Q. And what was inside the trunk? 
A. There were four suitcases. 
Q. Did you ask if you could look in those suitcases? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I asked him what 
was in the suitcases, and he told me, right quickly, 
clothes. Then when I looked at him again, he told me 
that he didn't know where they came from, they must have 
been in there when he rented the car. 
Q. At that point, you opened the suitcases? 
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A. Couldn't open them, they were padlocked shut. 
Q. So, you broke the lock? 
A* No. I—one part could zip open a little ways, and I 
opened it—or unzipped it, far enough where I could see 
the contents of one bag. 
Q. And you didn't ask permission to look inside the 
suitcases, did you? 
A. I don't recall if I asked specifically to look inside 
those/ no. 
Q. So, to look inside the suitcases, you were based on the 
permission to look inside the vehicle; is that correct? 
A. Well, I retract that. His first response was clothes 
when I asked him what it was, and then I asked him if I 
could look in the suitcases, and he told me, well, 
they're not mine, they must have been in the trunk when 
I rented the car. So, yes, he did say they weren't his. 
Q. If they weren't his, how come you charged him with the 
crime? 
A. He told me they weren't his, that's what he said. He 
said go—when I asked— 
Q. But you didn't ever get permission from him to search 
the suitcases, did you? And at that point, you had them 
out of the vehicle; is that correct? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). I took one out. 
Q. And it was lockedi 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q. And you had to work around the lock to look inside? 
A. Well, there was a little play in it, enough where you 
could see inside. 
Q. And to look inside the suitcase, you were basing the 
permission to look inside the vehicle? 
A. Yes. 
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Mr. Marshall contends that Trooper Avery's request to -look 
in the car" did not constitute a request to search the vehicle. 
We disagree. Mr. Marshall gave his consent, although not 
precisely phrased as consent "to search," then stood by while the 
trooper searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
"Failure to object to the continuation of the search under these 
circumstances may be considered an indication that the search was 
within the scope of consent." United States v. Esoinoza, 782 
F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986); £££ also United States v. 
Cprrgl-CQirrgl/ 702 F. Supp. 1539, 1544 (D. Wyo. 1988). 
Because of our holding, we need not reach the more difficult 
issue of whether Mr. Marshall^ opening the trunk constituted 
implied consent to search the trunk under the totality of the 
circumstances presented. See United States v. Almand, 565 F.2d 
927, 930 (5th Cir.), cert, denied. 439 U.S. 824 (1978) (voluntary 
consent found where defendant silently reached into his pocket, 
removed key, then unlocked and opened camper door). 
Mr. Marshall did not consent to Trooper Avery1s search of the 
locked suitcases. The state does not argue that Mr. Marshall's 
consent to search the trunk should be construed to include locked 
suitcases found in the trunk.8 Rather, the state argues that 
his disclaimer of ownership of the suitcases should be construed 
to validate the search. We agree that Mr. Marshall made a 
somewhat ambiguous disclaimer of ownership of the four suitcases 
found in the trunk of the vehicle, but he did not give his 
consent to their search.9 The state has not referred us to any 
case where a disclaimer of ownership has been held to be a 
voluntary consent to search. The cases approving the subsequent 
search of a suitcase after disclaimer of ownership have all 
turned on the threshold issue of standing or abandonment, not 
8. Sse State v. Cffle. 31 Wash. App. 501, 643 P.2d 675 (1982), 
where the defendant gave permission to search his hatchback 
vehicle, but did not give consent to search the suitcases found 
in the vehicle, id. at 678. The court held that the consent to 
search the vehicle did not encompassed the suitcases. Id* 
9. Trooper Avery believed that Mr. Marshall's denial of 
ownership of the suitcases validated the search. He did what our 
case law has instructed and the defect in the search was not as a 
result of his actions, but rather those of the prosecutor in 
failing to properly raise the issue of standing. 
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consent.10 We refuse to rely on this authority as it would 
allow the state to circumvent the teachings of State v. 
Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), and allow the state to^ 
raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time 
on appeal by way of the back door* 
In summary, we reverse the trial court1s denial of the motion 
to suppress as Mr. Marshall did not consent-in-fact11 to the 
search of the locked suitcases found in the trunk of his vehicle. 
Judith M. Billings, Judgcr 
10. See United States v. Williams. 538 F.2d 549, 550-51 (4th 
Cir. 1976) (court found abandonment and held cases properly 
seized when defendant denied ownership of certain cases found in 
his motel room and allowed the search of the cases); United 
States v. Colbert. 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (court found 
abandonment when defendants disclaimed ownership of suitcases and 
began to walk away from them). 
11. We do not reach the issue of the voluntariness of Mr. 
Marshall's consent to the search of the car, the trunk, or the 
suitcases because we find there was no consent-in-fact to the 
search of the suitcases. See, e.g.. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 
412 U.S. 218 (1973) (analysis of voluntariness of consent); State 
v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (state did 
not sustain its burden to prove defendant's consent was 
voluntary). 
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3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: The law stipulated that we can 
3 hear this in Utah County for Millard County -- no, 
4 Juab County. J told you wrong. In any event, that 
5 was the understanding. 
6 Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Eyre, for 
7 the State? 
8 MR. EYRE: We are, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: And Mr. Harmon? 
10 MR. HARMON: I'm prepared in the absence of 
11 my client. For the record, your Honor, I should 
12 note that he called in the office after the last 
13 continuance, and was advised of the continuance, 
14 then he called in after that and gave me a new 
15 mailing address in Salt Lake City. A copy of the 
16 order stating the hearing for todav was mailed to 
17 him at that address, together with a letter* 
18 advising him to be here today. Those letters did 
19 not come back, but I've had no contact with him. 
20 THE COURT: And he was directed to be here 
21 at 1:30, and it's now 2 p.m.? 
22 MR. HARMON: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: All right. I take it that you 
24 want to proceed, Mr. Eyre? 
25 MR. EYRE: That is correct. 
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1 THE COURT: And the matter1 we're proceeding 
2 with is State of Utah versus Jesus A. Sepulveda. 
3 This is a motion to suppress, so go right ahead. 
4 MR. EYRE: Call Paul Mangelson to the 
5 s tand. 
6 PAUL MANGELSON 
7 being first duly sworn, was deposed 
8 and testified as follows: 
9 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. EYRE: 
13 Q. Your name is Faul Mangelson? 
12 A. Yes, it is. 
13 Q. And you're a Sergeant for the Utah Highway 
14 Patrol? 
15 A. Yes, l a m . 
16 Q. How many years have you been employed with 
17 the highway patrol? 
18 A. Just about 24. 
19 Q. Would you relate to the Court the training 
20 and experience you've had with respect to drug law 
21 enforcement and drug identification. 
22 A . I originally attended the Camp Williams 
23 Police Academy in 1967. At that particular time we 
24 studied drugs. We burned some marijuana in class, 
25 seen what it smelled like, looked at it through a 
BEVERLY LOWE RPR/CSR 
1 mi croscope . 
2 Since that time Ifve been to quite a few 
3 in-service training schools; one by New Mexico, one 
4 1 by new Jersey, one by Louisianna. 
5 I'm involved in the Utah Highway Patrol 
6 training of criminal interdiction I've been on the 
7 job for those 23-and-a-half years and came in 
8 contact with drugs on thousands of occasions. 
9 Q. Referring you now to January 30th of this 
10 year, were you on duty within Juab County on that 
11 date? 
12 A . I was. 
13 Q. On that date did you have occasion to come 
14 in contact with the defendant Jesus A . Sepulveda? 
15 A. I did. 
16 Q. Where did that contact take place? 
37 A. It occurred on the northbound lanes of 
18 1-15 at approximately milepost 221 which is just a 
19 little bit south of Nephi. 
20 Q. Did you observe a motor vehicle in which 
21 Mr. Sepulveda was an occupant? 
22 A . I did. 
23 Q. Were you mobile or stationary at the time 
24 of that initial observation? 
25 A . I believe at the initial observation T was 
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1 s tat i onary . 
2 Q. Describe what you observed on that 
3 occas i on. 
4 A. The vehicle had came by me, and I pulled 
5 out, caught up with the vehicle, noticed that it 
6 had expired registration, and stopped the vehicle 
7 for that reason. 
8 Q. Describe the vehicle for the Court. 
9 A. The vehicle was a red Camero It had a 
10 Utah plate on it, and the plate had expired in 
11 Decembei* of '89, and we was into January of f 9 0 
12 then. 
13 Q . Do you on a routine basis stop people for 
14 expired registrations? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And issue them citations for that offense? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. What time of day was this; do you recall? 
19 A. This was around 10 O'clock in the morning. 
20 Q. And how did you stop the vehicle? 
21 A. By the use of a red spotlight. 
22 Q. Upon stopping the vehicle, did you come in 
23 contact with the driver of the vehicle? 
24 A . I did. 
25 Q. Who was the driver? 
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1 A. The driver' was Jesus A. Sepulveda. 
2 Q. Were there any other passengers in the 
3 vehi c1e? 
4 A. Yes, there was. 
5 Q. Where were they located? 
6 A. The passenger in the front was Barbara 
7 Gallegos. There was a passenger in the rear, a 
8 juvenile by the name of Jose Santos. 
9 Q. Upon stopping the vehicle and coming in 
10 contact with the driver, what did you initially do? 
11 A . I asked for driver's license and 
12 registration, and advised the driver why I!d 
1 3 stopped him. 
14 Q. And was he able to produce either one? 
15 A. He gave me a temporary California 
16 license that wasn't valid, and he didn't have a 
1 7 reg i stra t ion. 
18 Q. Did you make an inquiry as to how he came 
19 into possession of this particular vehicle? 
20 A . I did. He stated the car belonged to a 
21 friend in California. He said that they had gone 
22 to California on Friday night in a pick-up truck, 
23 and it had broke down, down in California, and 
24 they'd got this car from a friend down there. 
25 Q. Was he able to tell you the name or the 
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address of this friend? 
A. No, he couldn't. I asked him that. I 
asked him if he'd give me the name of the friend 
and the address, and he couldn't do either one. 
Q. And there was no registration in the 
vehi cle? 
A. There was not. 
Q. Did he have any permission slip or any 
written authorization that he was in possession of 
the vehicle? 
A. No, he didn't. He had nothing. 
Q. After you'd obtained this information from 
the driver, what then did you do? 
A. I talked to the one occupant. I asked her 
for ID. She explained that she was a friend of 
the driver and that she had just gone along to 
California on this trip just for the ride. The 
rear passenger was 16 years old, and he was a 
friend of the driver's. Both had the same address 
in California, also. Yet they were coming back to 
Utah, and they really couldn't give me a reason why 
they was even coming back to Utah. 
Q. You made an inquiry of that? 
A. I did. 
Q. And they didn't have a reason? 
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A. No . 
Q. With respect to driver Jesus Sepulveda, 
does he speak English? 
A. He spoke fairly good English, yes. 
Anytime he had a problem understanding anything I 
said, the girl would interpret for him, which was 
very seldom. 
Q. After you made the inquiry of the two 
passengers, what then did you do? 
A. An observation that T!d made during all 
this time I was talking, that the more I talked and 
the more T asked him questions about the car and 
why he was coming back to Utah, he became extremely 
nervous, obviously nervous. His hands were visibly 
shaking, and it was obvious to me that he was 
extremely nervous. 
Q. And after you've made those observations, 
you didn't make any other observations to the 
interior of the vehicle or --
A. The interior was quite cluttered up, and 
it appeared that they'd been living in the car. 
Other than that, no other observations, 
Q. And what then did you do? 
A. I asked him why he was so nervous; if he 
had contraband in his car that he was afraid I was 
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1 going to find. He said no. Then I asked if I 
2 could search the car for this -- guns or alcohol or 
3 drugs, and he said, "Go ahead," 
4 Q. Was he still in the vehicle when you had 
5 this conversation? 
6 A. Yes, everyone was still in the vehicle, 
7 Q. And after he gave you consent to search 
8 the vehicle, what then did you do? 
9 A. I had all three of the occupants exit the 
10 vehicle, I checked the two male individuals for 
11 weapons, patted them down. In doing so, on the 
32 passenger in the rear I found a small marijuana 
13 pipe or a small smoking device in the passenger's 
1 4 back pocke t. 
15 Q. Did he give any explanation for that? 
16 A. Yeah, he said hefd found it on the streets 
17 in fcc^s Angeles. 
18 Q. After you found those -- that particular 
19 item, what then did you do? 
20 A . I proceeded to search the vehicle. I 
21 asked about the trunk, and he said he didn't have 
22 the key for the trunk. He said he could open it 
23 with a screwdriver. He got a screwdriver out and 
24 opened the trunk. 
25 Q. He did that himself? 
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1 A. He did that himself, yes. He actually 
2 broke the lock on the trunk to open it for me. I 
3 mean, he was that intent on showing me that there 
4 was nothing there. I felt like he was really --
5 this was a rouse, you know, just to show me that he 
6 had nothing. I did check the trunk and there was 
7 nothing there. Just to go along with him, after 
8 he'd broke the trunk open. I then proceeded to 
9 check the interior. I felt the seats. I've 
10 checked Cameros on quite a few occasions and I know 
11 where there's a -- that there's a pretty good 
12 hiding place in the back of he seats. 
13 Q. Have you found contraband concealed in 
14 those compartments in the bucket seats on other 
15 occasions in Cameros? 
16 A. Yes, I have. 
17 Q. How many times? 
18 A. Oh, several times. 
19 Q. After you felt them, did you make any 
20 other examination of the screws on the seats? 
21 A . I did. Generally you can just squeeze the 
22 seats together, and if there's anything in there 
23 you can usually feel it. I could not feel anything 
24 on this occasion, but I noticed the screws — 
25 there's two screws at the bottom that hold a 
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1 plastic backing on the seats, and I noticed that 
2 these screws were marked up, indicating that they'd 
3 been taken in and out on several occasions. So, I 
4 decided to go ahead and remove them and take a 
5 1ook. 
6 Q. And did you retrieve a screwdriver from 
7 your vehicle or — 
8 A . I don't remember for sure, but I did get a 
9 Phillips screwdriver, and I removed the two screws, 
10 and inside were two Reynolds wrapped packages that 
11 contained white material — aluminum foil is what 
12 I'm trying to say. 
13 Q . I show you what's been marked as State's 
14 Exhibit No. 1 and ask if you've seen those items? 
15 A. Yes, I have. 
16 Q. What are they? 
17 A. Those are the two items that were removed 
18 from the back seat, also the pipe that was removed 
19 from the young boy's back pocket. 
20 Q . I show you what's been marked as State's 
21 Exhibit No. 3, a photograph, and ask if you've s^en 
22 that photograph before? 
23 A. Yes, I have. 
24 Q. Do you know what it depicts? 
25 A. This depicts the back seat of the Camero 
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3 after I'd taken the two screws out of the bottom 
2 and raised up the plastic backing. 
3 THE COURT: Could I interrupt you. I've 
4 got a jury that's ready to come back* If I could 
5 get you to just kind of move back, and could you 
6 step down, Officer Mangelson. It won't be but 
7 maybe 10 or 15 minutes. If you want to go out in 
8 the hall or what have you, you may, or you may stay 
9 in the courtroom. It will take us a few minutes, I 
10 think, to get the -- everybody here. 
31 (Hearing recessed then resumed after interruption) 
12 Q. BY MR. EYRE: Sergeant Mangelson, at this 
13 time I show you what's been marked as State's 
14 Exhibit No. 2 and ask if you know what that 
15 depi cts? 
16 A. Yes. This depicts the back-end of the 
17 Camero showing the Utah plate that has an expired 
18 deca1 on it. 
19 Q. After you found the two aluminum foil 
20 wrapped packages in the seat, what then did you du? 
21 A. Arrested all three individuals for 
22 possession of a controlled substance, told them of 
23 their Miranda rights, and proceeded to take 
24 pictures of the car. I called for some backup 
2 5 also. 
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1 Q. Did you conduct an inventory search of the 
2 vehi cle? 
3 A. Yes, I did. 
4 Q. Did you find any other contraband pursuant 
5 to that search? 
6 A. The only other contraband that was found 
7 was a very small amount of marijuana. 
8 Q . I show you State's Exhibit No. 1 again, 
9 and indicate to you a tissue contained in that 
10 also. Did you find that at that time? 
11 A. I did. 
12 Q. Where was it located? 
13 A. It was located in the front part of the 
14 vehicle, and had a small amount of white powder on 
15 it that appeared to be cocaine. 
16 Q. At the time of the arrest of these 
17 individuals, did you seize the items contained in 
18 State's Exhibit No. 1? 
19 A. Yes, I did. 
20 Q. And then you had them in your sole control 
21 and possession since that time? 
22 A. Yes, except for the times they were at the 
23 crime lab. 
24 Q. You've had the items in Exhibit 1 analyzed 
25 at the crime lab; is that correct? 
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A. Yes, I have. 
Q. I show you what's been marked as State's 
Exhibit No. 4 and ask you if you've seen that 
before? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. What is it? 
A. This is the analysis results from the 
crime lab. 
Q. For the items contained in State's Exhibit 
No . 1? 
A. Yes. 
MR. EYRE: I ha*e no further questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Harmon? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HARMON: 
Q. Officer Mangleson, you indicated that you 
were on 1-15 by milepost 221. This red Camero 
comes by you, and you pulled out and followed it. 
Could you tell us why you decided to follow the 
car? 
A. The occupants appeared to be very young to 
me, as they come by me. I simply pulled out to 
take a second look at them. 
Q. Were they all hispanic? 
A. Yes, they were. 
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1 Q. In your drug interdiction work, do you 
2 have a loose profile that you use? 
3 A. Do we have a what? 
4 Q. A loose profile. 
5 A . I guess you could call it that. 
6 Q. Could you tell us what things would fit in 
7 that profile? 
8 A. Well, there have been a lot of hispanics 
9 that have been picked up hauling narcotics. 
10 Q. Has a Camero-type automobile been one of 
11 the favori te-type vehicles? 
12 A. We've picked up a lot of Cameros, yes. I 
13 think we've picked up about every kind of -- every 
14 other kind of vehicle also. 
15 Q. And are they generally traveling 
16 northbound as this vehicle was going? 
17 A. Well, we've caught them going both ways, 
18 but as a rule, drugs go north and money goes south. 
19 Q. You have had prior experience with 
20 Camero-type vehicles hauling narcotics, apparently, 
21 in various compartments that can be opened up in 
22 those cars? 
23 A. That's correct. 
24 Q. You indicated that as you stopped the 
25 defendant, he showed you a temporary California 
BEVERLY LOWE RPR/CSR 
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1 license. What was it that made that not valid? 
2 A. It was a temporary instruction permit, and 
3 it was valid for a certain number of days. He had 
4 to be accompanied by a California licensed driver 
5 18 years or older to make this license valid. 
6 Q. And did anyone else in the car have a 
7 valid California driver's license? 
8 A. No, they did not. 
9 Q. Okay. Did you check i^n that with each of 
10 the other persons? 
11 A. I did. 
12 Q. Okay. Were there any of them that were 
13 over 21 years of age? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Who was the ; ? 
16 A. Miss Gallegos was. 
17 Q. Okay. You indicated that ther< was no 
18 registration in the vehicle, but it was a Utah 
19 licensed car; is that right? 
20 A. Yes, it was. 
21 Q. Were you able to check through your radio 
22 on the registration on the car to find out if it 
23 had a valid registration somewhere? 
24 A. As I recall, this vehicle was registered 
25 to a Mary Espinoza from the Salt Lake area, if I 
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1 recall. 
2 Q. Was there any attempt made to contact her 
3 to find out if the car had been stolen or anything 
4 like that? 
5 A. There had been no report on the car as 
6 stolen. 
7 Q. As you talked with Mr. Sepulveda, did he 
8 speak to you in Spanish mostly? 
9 A. No, he spoke mostly English. 
10 Q. Okay. There were occasions when you had 
11 to have Miss Gallegos do some interpreting for you; 
12 1 is that right? 
13 A. There was, yes. 
14 Q. Were you able to detect what it was that 
15 they were saying to each other when they spoke in 
16 Spanish? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Did soifre of that interpreting go on at the 
19 time when you talked with them about examining the 
20 interior of the car? 
21 A. I don't recall exactly which times it was. 
22 The main times, though, I checked with her to make 
23 sure that he understood. 
24 Q. And was there also a use of her as an 
25 interpreter when you asked them to get out of the 
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1 car? 
2 A. I don't recall that. 
3 Q. How about when you asked them to open the 
4 trunk of the car? 
5 A. 1 don't recall that either. 
6 Q. Is it possible that as you had them open 
7 the trunk, that you provided "him the screwdriver 
8 out of your car? 
9 A. That is possible, yes. 
10 Q. And so, he would have been opening the 
11 trunk at your direction with your screwdriver? 
12 A. Basically. I asked him to open the trunk 
33 and he had to break into it. 
14 Q. How was he dressed? 
15 A. To tell you the truth, I don't remember. 
16 I don't believe I have a record of it. 
17 Q. Is it possible that he was there without a 
18 coa t on? 
19 A. That's possible, yes. 
20 Q. Maybe even been in a T-shirt or something 
21 like that? 
22 A. That is possible. 
23 Q. And do you recall what the weather was 
24 like on this day? 
25 A . I don't have a record of it, but I would 
BFVFPT.V r nwt? 
1 imagine it was cool, being in January. 
2 Q, Was there any detectable odor of marijuana 
3 about the vehicle? 
4 A . I don't recall any, no. 
5 Q. Now, you've indicated that you did an 
6 inventory search of the vehicle and you found a 
7 small amuujn of marijuana. Where was that located? 
8 A. Located on the rear floor in a piece of 
9 aluminum foil. 
10 Q. Then you found a tissue with some cocaine 
11 residue, or what appeared to be cocaine in it? 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. Where was that located? 
14 A. In the front part of the vehicle. 
15 Q. Do you remember if it was by the dashboard 
16 or on the seat? 
17 A. As I recall, it was on the dashboard. 
18 Q. Did you have to open the tissue up in 
19 order to see the contents? 
2 0 A. Yes. 
21 Q. The marijuana that was in the back, was 
22 that -- did you have to open the aluminum foil up 
23 in order to see that? 
24 A. Yes, you did. 
25 Q. Apparently, from your training and 
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1 experience, if there had been marijuana recently 
2 smoked in the vehicle, you would have detected 
3 that; is that right? 
4 A . I would think so, yes. 
5 Q. And when I say "recently," that may be 
6 within the last five or six days? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 MR. HARMON: I think that's all I have, 
9 your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Eyre, anything further? 
11 MR. EYRE: A couple last questions. 
12 RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION 
13 BY MR. EYRE: 
14 Q. Sergeant Mangelson, with respect to 
15 ownership of the vehicle, did you check — run a 
16 computer check on that vehicle before or after the 
17 arrest of the individuals? 
18 A. It was after. 
19 Q. So, you had no knowledge as to whether it 
20 was stolen or not prior to the arrest of the 
21 individuals; is that correct? 
22 A. No, I didn 1t. 
23 Q. And at that time you had no knowledge 
24 whether they were in rightful possession of the 
25 vehicle or not; is that correct? 
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1 A. No , I did not . 
2 Q . After the arrest of the individuals, did 
3 you have any conversation with the passenger 
4 Barbara Gal legos? 
5 A . I did. 
6 Q. What did she say and what did you say at 
7 that time? 
8 A. She handed — do we want this part of the 
9 record? 
10 Q. Yes. 
11 A. She handed me a note with a phone number 
12 on it, and told me to call that number and tell the 
13 individual who I had stopped. I said, "Who are 
14 you?" She told me that she was an undercover agent 
15 for DEA, and that she had gone to California with 
16 this individual. She had gained his confidence, 
17 and she was quite certain that there was narcotics 
18 in the car, but that she didn't know where they 
1 9 were. 
20 At that point I didn't know whether she 
21 was pulling my leg or what the circumstances was. 
22 So, I still just considered her a -- basically the 
23 same as anybody else in the car. 
24 Later on I did confirm that what she had 
25 told me was true. 
BEVERLY LOWE --- RPR/CSR 
23 
1 Q. That she was assisting the DEA in an 
2 investigation; is that correct? 
3 A. That's correct. 
4 MR. EYRE: Nothing further. 
5 THE COURT: Anything on that, Mr. Harmon? 
6 RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. HARMON: 
8 Q. In relationship to the time when you 
9 opened up the back seat of the car, when was it 
10 that you had the conversation with Miss Gallegos? 
11 A. Prior to that. 
12 Q. Was it prior to the time when you'd seen 
13 the screws on the back seat that appeared as if 
14 they'd been turned with a screwdriver? 
15 A . I believe that I had noticed them prior to 
16 that . 
17 MR. HARMON: That's all I have, your Honor. 
18 MR. EYRE: Nothing further. 
19 THE COURT: You can step down. Thank you. 
20 MR. EYRE: We would offer the exhibits, 
21 your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: They'll be received. 
23 MR. HARMON: No objection for the purpose 
24 of saving time. 
25 MR. EYRE: Do you want to examine them? 
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1 THE COURT: I assume they're what you 
? represent them to be. 
3 MF . HARMON: I don't suppose we'd want the 
4 Court confirming that the cocaine isn't cocaine by 
5 way of testimony. 
6 THE COURT: Yeah, I'm not competent to do 
7 that. 
8 Okay, do you have anything else that you 
9 want to present? I guess there isn't much that you 
10 can, huh? 
11 MR. HARMON: No, your Honor. I do have a 
12 memorandum that I've prepared and I'll put the 
13 addition -- the facts in it from this day's hearing 
34 and deliver .it to the Court Tuesday? 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to send 
16 yours in at the appropriate time? 
17 MR. HARMON: Okay. Ten days after that? 
18 THE COURT: Fine; and you'll have how long? 
19 MR. EYRE: I'll have it to the Court 
20 Tuesday. 
21 THE COURT: Okay- So, ten days after you 
22 receive yours. All right, fine. Thank you. I'll 
23 take it under advisement, then. Wait for the 
24 memorandum and we'll be in recess. 
25 (Court in recess) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss . 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Beverly A. Lowe, Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public for the State of Utah, 
cerify : 
That I am an official court reporter in. 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of 
Utah; 
That I was present during the entire 
proceedings in the before entitled cause; that the 
proceedings were reported stenographically by me, 
and were therafter transcribed; that said transript 
constitutes to the best of my ability, a true and 
complete record of the proceedings had. 
IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have subscribed 
my name and affixed my seal this 17TH day of 
October, 1990 
^?«.-^A.Le**\* ^  Beverly^ A . Lowe, CSR/RPR 
^ -
1/ H. 
pnwo, UT 84604 ;;-VJ NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE 
Conwn.fr'*- f * * - J 
v*%. >H? J COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH. 
My Commission expires: 2-24-92 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH * rU'uriActt,C • ' ,' 
* * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, Casxfe Number: 296-D 
vs. DECISION 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
JESUS A. SEPULVEDA, 
Defendant. 
********** 
The motion of the defendant to suppress evidence obtained 
from a vehicle driven by the defendant which was stopped by 
Trooper Mangelson near Nephi, Juab County, Utah, came before the 
Court for hearing on October 3, 1990, by stipulation of counsel, 
the defendant having heretofore waived his rights to a speedy 
trial. 
The State presented its evidence through Trooper 
Mangelson, with certain stipulations as to the contraband found in 
the vehicle driven by the defendant identifying it as one kilo of 
cocaine. The Trooper gave the only testimony presented at the 
hearing with reference to the circumstances of the stop, the 
warrant less search of the vehicle, and all other surrounding 
facts and circumstances observed and participated in by the 
Trooper and defendant and those in the vehicle driven by the 
defendant. 
n r\ 
From the testimony given it appears that the following 
facts are those testified to by the Trooper and not contested by 
any other witness since no one else was called by the State or the 
defendant. 
Trooper Mangelson testified that he first observed the 
defendant vehicle which was a Camaro (a stylish General Motor 
sports car) but that it had an expired Utah registration. Upon 
effecting the stop the officer asked the defendant for a driver's 
license and registration which the defendant was unable to 
produce. The defendant claimed the vehicle belonged to his friend 
an* was being used to return to Utah since the vehicle they went 
to California in broke down. The defendant could not give a name 
of his friend who owed the vehicle nor an address. 
The officer noted that as the conversation with defendant 
extended he observed the defendant reacting in a very nervous and 
visibly shaking manner. After being asked if the vehicle was 
carrying any drugs or firearms and responding no# the trooper 
asked if he could search the vehicle to which he said go ahead. 
The officer requested the passengers to exit the vehicle 
at which time they did and he frisked them for weapons, and found 
a small marijuana pipe in the pocket of a juvenile who was a 
passenger in the vehicle. The defendant did not have a key to the 
trunk but got access to it for the search through use of a screw 
driver. While searching the vehicle the officer noted screws that 
had paint wear marks on them indicating some form of recent use 
it 
and lead to the discovery of a compartment under the seat wherein 
one kilo of cocaine was retrieved. 
It is also noted that the testimony presented by the 
trooper was to the effect that a women passenger in the subject 
vehicle had taken the trooper aside and indicated to him that she 
was an agent for the D.E.A. and that there was contraband in the 
car after which the officer proceeded to the discovery through the 
compartment under the seat to whir . access was obtained through 
use of the screwdriver on the wore screws. 
The two paramounts considerations that this set of facts 
give rise to are whether or not there was probable cause for the 
stop of the vehicle, and a subsequent search of it. There is also 
an issue to whether or not the defendant under the circumstances 
of this case had any standing to object to the officer searching 
the vehicle aside from the probable cause question, and lastly 
whether or not a consent was obtained to search the vehicle by the 
trooper from the defendant. 
The Court concludes that the facts in this case support 
the right of the trooper to proceed with a search of the vehicle 
under all of the above issues. 
As to the initial stop of the vehicle, the only testimony 
presented indicates that t&cre was no valid Utah registration 
presented for the car which showed a violation of the registration 
laws which justified the officer in making the stop which would 
not be unreasonable under the circumstances of the expired 
13. 
registration observed by the officer. The fact that after the 
stop the defendant could not produce a drivers license nor could 
he give any ownership information other than that it was a friends 
car whose name he could not give nor whose address he could give 
would justify the officer in proceeding with additional questions 
which the uncontraverted testimony shows that consent was given 
for the vehicle search and no evidence would support a showing of 
the consent being coerced or in any manner otherwise unlawfully 
obtained. 
It would appear that the totality of circumstances after 
the initial stop and learning from a third party in the vehicle 
who was identified as a D.E.A. operative was a direct statement to 
the officer that there was contraband in the vehicle which 
occurred prior to obtaining the consent or at least proceeding 
with the search would certainly give probable cause under exigent 
circumstances, the detention being on a highway some distance from 
a source for obtaining a search warrant would certainly give 
probable cause to the officer to proceed. The fact that the 
consent was given would clearly confirm the actions of the officer 
in going into areas that he deemed suspicious within the car in 
locating the contraband. 
Based on the foregoing analysis on the basis of evidence 
presented only by the trooper, there has been no showing that the 
search was unreasonable, and to the contrary it appears that the 
records shows it to be a reasonable search tinder the circumstances 
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presented by this case. 
Defendant's motion to suppress is denied, trial in this 
matter is set for the 29th day of January 1991, at 10:00 a.m. 
o'clock or the follow the regular law and motion calendar in 
Nephi, Utah. 
Dated t h i s <6 day of Hb^fi6lfe$t990. 
BY THE COURT 
GEORGE^E. BALLIF, JUDG^ 
cc: counsel 
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